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abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyse the possible implications 
of Peirce’s categories for a project of a community. In order to do so, I 
will start by analysing the first formulation of these categories in Peirce’s 
early writings, and then I will compare them with their later formulations. 
Thus, we will see some their most important characteristics, namely, 
their universality and their dynamism, which will allow for a particular 
understanding of the role that logic can play in his system, in a theory 
of scientific inquiry and, finally, in a community in general. 
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uNIveRsaL omNI-PReseNt categoRIes
During the 1860s, Peirce published2 a series of articles which contain 
the general framework of his late philosophy. In fact, we can find the 
idea of truth as the consensus reached in the long run by a community 
of inquirers, or the idea that the constant repetition of induction can 
lead to truth (Peirce, 1869, 56-82). We can also find the idea that the 
notion of unknowable is absurd (Peirce, 1868b, 28-55), the idea that all 
thoughts are present only as signs (Id.) and the idea that these thoughts 
follow three forms of inference (Peirce, 1867). But, above all, we can 
find an early formulation of his theory of categories (Id.), in which he 
articulates these and other themes in his thinking. 
By contrasting the first formulation of his thought in process with the 
later formulation of his theory, our intention is to find some characteristics 
of Peirce’s famous theory of categories that can help us to define certain 
consequences of his thinking, namely, some social consequences that can serve 
as a basis to highlight the richness and possibilities of his threefold categories 
for a social and political understanding of both science and knowledge, and 
vice-versa, a pragmaticist3 understanding of politics and society. 
The first official formulation of Peirce’s categories can be found in his 
1867 article, On a New List of Categories (ONLC) (Peirce, 1867) the 
analysis of which will serve as the basis for our interpretation of some of 
the implications of his later theory. Before going into the text in depth, it 
is important for our purposes to state that ONLC departs from a profound 
anti-psychologism and a radical rejection of the phenomenon/noumenon 
distinction.4 Regarding his anti-psychologism, Peirce’s aim is to show how 
it is possible for thought to be general, independent of its concrete nature 
in a particular individual. Psychology, or a psychological perspective, 
cannot deliver these conditions, and consequently it is impossible for 
psychology to be the cornerstone of logic. Regarding his rejection of the 
2 All internal quotations are taken from Essential Peirce. Vol. 1. Ed. by Nathan 
Houser & Christian Kloesel. Vol. 2. Ed. by The Peirce Edition Project. Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 1992-1997. Hereafter they will be cited by 
the name of the article, the volume, and the page number. 
3 I will follow Peirce’s terminology: pragmaticism for pragmatism.
4 In this formulation of the relation between Peirce and Kant, I am following 
Douglas Niño’s interpretation. (Niño, 2004). (My translation and paraphrasing); and 
the discussion between Buzzelli (1972).
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phenomenon/noumenon distinction, his difference with Kant is apparent: 
While Kant argues that the mind brings its categorical mould to experience 
and that in order to grant the objective validity of subjective synthesis an 
incognoscibĭilis noumenon must be postulated, Peirce, in this early phase 
of his thinking, rejects the notion of the noumenon because he believes 
that stating what is unknowable is nonsense. Briefly: a representation must 
have content, and if the representation of the noumenon has no content, 
then the noumenon is trying to represent what it is non-representable, 
and therefore, to speak of a noumenon is to speak of a representation that 
is not a representation (Niño, 2004, 2). On the other hand, in Peirce’s 
opinion, the phenomenon is something representable, and thus thinkable: 
it is experience which brings the scheme, or a mould, to the mind, and 
it is only later that the mind brings it back to experience. Although it 
would lead us to far afield to go deeper into this issue, let us assert that 
Peirce’s rejection of the noumenon/phenomenon distinction would have 
consequences in his theory of cognition/representation and in his method 
of searching for his categories (De Tienne, 1989). 
Regarding the text of the ONLC itself, then, it is worthy to note already 
in the first paragraph the relation between Kant’s and Peirce’s categories. 
This paper is based upon the theory already established, that the 
function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of sensuous 
impressions to unity, and that the validity of a conception consists 
in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity 
without the introduction of it (Peirce, 1867, 1).
As Niño shows (Niño, 2004, 3), what is striking about this paragraph 
is how much it agrees with Kant and how much it disagrees with Kant. 
Kant’s aim, it can be said, is to give objective validity to the subjective 
conditions of understanding, and according to him, this validity can only 
be granted through a transcendental deduction. When Kant speaks of his 
categories, he mentions them in his Transcendental Logic as the twelve 
functions of understanding that entail the passage from the basic concepts 
of general logic to those of the transcendental logic. In this sense, Peirce 
agrees with Kant, since reducing “the manifold of sensuous impressions to 
unity” means that the purpose of the categories is to convey the conditions 
under which the objects of experience can be thought about. In other 
words, it is the function of understanding to produce propositions that 
give sense to the many things that we encounter in experience. Indeed, 
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these conceptions behave as the conditions of intelligibility because they 
produce propositions as “bricks with which knowledge is built up, and 
without them the production of bricks ceases.” (Niño, 2004, 3) In this 
sense, a conception or category is not something present in sensorial 
impressions but an element of understanding, added to cognition, aimed 
at reducing those sensuous impressions to unity. Paraphrasing Peirce, it 
can be said that any reflection on an impression, given that it is a step 
that leads to the unity of consistency, is a conception. 
However, while in Kant some category among the twelve is always 
indispensable for understanding, none is wide enough to be capable of 
containing all thought (Kant, CPR: A 79-83), and this is precisely where 
Peirce diverges from Kant. Let us examine this in detail through Douglas’ 
account. In Kant we find four classes of categories (quantity, quality, 
relation and modality) each of them containing three categories, making 
a total of twelve categories. However, one category from each class would 
play a role in each thought, that is, at least four, but not all twelve of 
them together. Therefore, some of the Kantian categories are necessary in 
order for an object of experience to become thought, but not all of them 
simultaneously. The same holds true with Aristotelian categories; in this 
sense and only in this sense, “neither the Aristotelian nor the Kantian 
categories are universal, but particular categories”. (Niño, 2004, p. 4), 
When Peirce, on the other hand, says in the second part of the sentence 
that the validity of a conception consists in the “impossibility of reducing 
the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it’, 
he is saying that the validity of a conception, that is, a category, is its 
universality, the necessity of being included in all thought. Therefore, this 
implies that Peirce’s effort will consist in describing elemental conceptions 
that are always present in the mind when something appears to it (Buzelli, 
1972). Beyond its universality and formality, Peirce’s categories will be 
omni-comprehensive, meaning that all of them together will contain not 
only all possible thought (as both Kantian and Aristotelian categories do) 
but each and every thought. 
But, why is it necessary to have “a plurality of categories, rather than 
one single universal and formal category”? (Niño, 2004, 5)
This theory gives rise to a conception of gradation among those 
conceptions which are universal. For one such conception may 
unite the manifold of sense and yet another may be required to unite 
the conception and the manifold to which it is applied, and so on. 
(Peirce, 1867, 1)
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Despite the fact that the purpose of these categories is to reduce 
multiplicity to unity, more than one category may be needed. It is possible, 
for example, that once understanding has introduced a category when 
faced with a multiplicity of sensuous impressions, unity of consistency is 
not yet reached. In this case, understanding will need another category 
to intervene. If with this second category unity were attained, then only 
two categories would be universally valid. But it is possible too, that even 
with the intervention of two conceptions unity is not yet reached, and a 
third conception will be needed, and so forth, until unity emerges. 
From the analysis of these two first paragraphs, then, we can infer that 
Peirce’s first intention to describe a new list of categories implies that 
his novelty is rooted in the necessity of finding first universal categories 
and secondly a plurality of them that covers each significant phase until 
unity is attained. 
the Idea oF PRocess
In contrast to Cartesian solipsism, Peirce raises a series of counter-
arguments that challenge both the intellectual process of attaining a truth 
(or, at least, a trustworthy conclusion) grounded in all a priori principles 
for conception-formation, including principles such as intuition and 
introspection, and the lonely work of the inquirer, conceived as a genius 
who reaches definitive certainty through his own mental powers, including 
the empiricist scope based on sensual experience and the idealist scope 
based on the strength of reason or on some sort of innate revelation. 
The rejection of interiority as the main source of knowledge goes as 
far as implying that even the delimitation of the concept of self finds 
content in external facts. These external forces do not merely include 
facts and objects but also other subjects and other subjects’ discourses. 
Consistent with this, Peirce develops the role played by others as witnesses. 
The role played by testimony is essential in configuring both the idea 
of the self and a dynamic understanding of science, and with it, an idea 
of community. 
Let us start with the idea of oneself. In Questions Concerning Certain 
Faculties Claimed for Man, Peirce asks and answers several questions 
concerning the nature of interiority, especially certain of its features such as 
intuition, introspection and self-consciousness. As he himself summarises it: 
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1. We have no power of introspection, but all knowledge of the internal 
world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of 
external facts. 2. We have no power of intuition, but every cognition 
is determined logically by previous cognitions (Peirce, 1868b, 30). 
Furthermore, in order to answer the question “whether we have an 
intuitive self-consciousness”, he looks for the origin of self-consciousness 
in the early stages of life and reason, that is, early childhood, and he 
concludes that self-consciousness comes not from innate intuition of the self 
but from a contrast between an individual’s apperceptions of the external 
world, or the absence of them, and the testimonies that others give about 
their experiences of the world. This contrast produces a consciousness of 
a difference between Oneself and the Other. 
Thus, he (the child) becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to 
suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives the 
first dawning of self-consciousness. (...) But, further, although usually 
appearances are either only confirmed or merely supplemented by 
testimony, yet there is a certain remarkable class of appearances which 
are continually contradicted by testimony. These are those predicates 
which we know to be emotional, but which he distinguishes by their 
connection with the movements of that central person, himself (...). 
These judgements are generally denied by others. Moreover, he has 
reason to think that others, also, have such judgements which are quite 
denied by all the rest. Thus, he adds to the conception of appearance as 
the actualization of fact, the conception of it as something private and 
valid only by supposing a self which is fallible (Peirce, 1868a, 20).
This awareness of ignorance and error not only leads the child to 
infer the existence of himself and the privacy of his emotions, but, as is 
implicit, it also corrects his understanding of the external world. A simple 
transposition of this idea to the level of science gives us a clear image of one 
of the pillars of Peirce’s thought: the development of science, and thus the 
attainment of truth, must be confirmed or corrected by others. But there 
must be a vehicle for this give and take, this proposition-error-correction 
triad; there must be a way to communicate and to assert validity. This 
need will be provided by both logic and the theory of signs. 
However, this possibility of self-correction on the part of science implies 
a dynamic character, in the sense that science is susceptible to change and 
that its own development also fuels its revisibility. Thought is essentially 
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dynamic, and as such it is a sort of in-apprehensible train of feelings. Its 
expressions, its representations or signs are but a highlighting of a moment: 
From our second principle, that there is no intuition or cognition 
not determined by previous cognitions, it follows that the striking 
in of a new experience is never an instantaneous affair, but is an 
event occupying time, and coming to pass by a continuous process. 
Its prominence in consciousness, therefore, must probably be the 
consummation of a growing process; and if so, there is no sufficient 
cause for the thought which had been the leading one just before, 
to cease abruptly and instantaneously. (...) Every thought, however 
artificial and complex, is, so far as it is immediately present, a mere 
sensation without parts, and therefore, in itself, without similarity 
to any other, but incomparable with any other and absolutely sui 
generis. Whatever is wholly incomparable with anything else is wholly 
inexplicable, because explanation consists in bringing things under 
general laws or under natural classes. Hence every thought, in so far 
as it is a feeling of a peculiar sort, is simply an ultimate, inexplicable 
fact. Yet it does not conflict with my postulate that no fact should 
be allowed to stand as inexplicable; for, on the one hand, we never 
can think, “This is present to me”, since, before we have time to 
make that reflection, the sensation is past, and on the other hand, 
when once past, we can never bring back the quality of the feeling 
as it was in and for itself, or know what it was like in itself, or even 
discover the existence of this quality except by a corollary from our 
general theory of ourselves, and then not in its idiosyncrasy, but only 
as something present. But, as something present, feelings are all alike 
and require no explanation, since they contain only what is universal. 
(Peirce, 1868b, 39-41).
Every movement feeds future movements, as in a dynamo. At the level 
of the individual, the process of reasoning, understanding or obtaining 
conceptions is essentially dynamic, but this dynamism will find a mirror 
at the collective level of science that we will try to use as a paradigm for 
social community as such. The process of unifying multiple sensorial 
data in one’s mind does not have a clear origin or an ultimate end either; 
rather it has a process, just like science has a method and communities 
have praxis. 
RamoN LLuLL JouRNaL oF aPPLIed ethIcs 2011.  Issue 2186
the thRee categoRIes aNd the socIaL PRocess oF 
scIeNce
Firstness is the quality itself, independent of anything else, the sheer 
appearance of phenomena, before they are understood or mediated; what 
is given to the senses before the object they come from is delimited. It is 
absolute freshness; we might call it adamicity. Secondness is the appearance 
of the fact, its delimitation by its contrast with everything else. Secondness 
is the emergence of the brute fact, before it becomes intelligible, but also 
after it has been differentiated from other facts or objects: it is what makes 
possible awareness of their existence. The existence of a concrete fact in 
the milieu of other facts means presence in the universe of experiences. 
It implies a dynamic reaction before all other things in the universe and 
therefore fundamentally implies relation.
Just as the first is not absolutely first if thought along with a second, 
so likewise to think the Second in its perfection we must banish 
every third. The Second is therefore the absolute last. But we need 
not, and must not, banish the idea of the first from the second; on 
the contrary, the Second is precisely that which cannot exist without 
the first. It meets us in such facts as Another, Relation, Compulsion, 
Effect, Dependence, Independence, Negation, Occurrence, Reality, 
Result (Peirce, 1888, 249).
The existence of something has a dyadic character because this existence 
becomes explicit only through opposition to other: this is its proper kind 
of relation. In secondness, a thing becomes distinguished from other things 
by emerging in its real determinacy in relation to all other things and 
thereby negating all other events, facts or objects as not being part of itself. 
If firstness offers the possibility of the presence of fact, and secondness 
its effective presence, thirdness refers to the intelligible aspect of facts. 
First and Second, Agent and Patient, Yes and No, are categories which 
enable us roughly to describe the facts of experience, and they satisfy 
the mind for a very long time. But at last they are found inadequate, 
and the Third is the conception which is then called for. The Third 
is that which bridges over the chasm between the absolute first and 
last, and brings them into relationship.
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Thirdness pertains to the realm of law, beyond the sensory manifold. It 
is the habit of becoming a habit that a universe in continuous development 
has and manifests in an ever-growing magnitude. Thirdness, then, is “that 
which is as it is as mediate between two others” (Houser, 1992, XXX).
Science is the collective process of obtaining thirdnesses, that is, laws, 
habits, mediations for understanding the objects of experience. In science, 
error and truth contain each other in the sense that it is through an 
established scientific truth that we can predicate that it is a mistake, and 
it is through error that we can hope to attain a new and better truth. In 
this sense, doubt must be a consequence of content, not a feigned attitude 
to justify pre-conditioned beliefs. Peirce, in his questioning of interiority 
as source for knowledge, takes the basis of Cartesianism and shows its 
limitations, and to do so, he starts with the idea of methodological doubt: 
Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in 
our hearts. (...) We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the 
ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, 
for the community of philosophers. Hence, if disciplined and candid 
minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought 
to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself. 
(Peirce, 1868b, 29).
For Peirce, the only method is logic. Logic is a system of representations 
aimed at expressing truth, but in itself it does not grant truth, as it is 
obvious. However, it conveys an order in the process of expressing 
thoughts that makes them quasi-universal: 
We cannot say that the generality of inductions are true, but only 
that in the long run they approximate to the truth. This is the truth 
of the statement, that the universality of an inference from induction 
is only the analogue of true universality (Peirce, 1869, 79).
And this is exactly why the content is subject to error. Logic provides 
this analogy, so it can be corrected by the facts of experience. And, at the 
same time, logic makes thoughts comparable with other thoughts through 
their structure. It provides something between relation and mediation. 
The latter is true at an individual level: logic brings mediation to the 
opposition of thoughts. The former is true of the collective level: logic 
gives form to the comparison of theories, of claimed truths. 
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An inquirer, a scientist, who tries to advance towards truth will face 
firstness, secondness and thirdness not only in her approach to facts in 
the world of nature or the realm of experiments, but also in her relation 
to science itself. Faced with a prevalent scientific theory, an inquirer is 
the other in relation to the theory. She must serve as an affirmative or 
negative witness of it. In this scenario, a temporarily valid truth (namely, 
the corpus of a tradition at any given time) is a phenomenon that every 
inquirer faces.1
Notwithstanding the fact that a scientific theory or a scientific law 
belongs to the sphere of thirdness, because it is precisely the hypothetically 
understood reality, the corpus of a scientific tradition at any given time 
–before every branch of science or every theorem is even differentiated– 
can be understood as playing the role of firstness in the inquirer’s mind. 
Scientific tradition is the quality of truth independent of anything else, 
a sheer appearance of a phenomenon that is faced when a human being 
decides to devote herself to the search for truth. 
Consecutively, a theory becomes present in relation to all other 
knowledge. It becomes different, distinct, in opposition not only to 
other theories but also to itself. It is a form of testimony that reciprocally 
delimits the knowledge that occupies the space within the community 
of inquirers and the consciousness of oneself as an inquirer. This is the 
secondness of science. At the same time, one becomes aware of the fact of 
a theory as opposed to other theories, and the radical opposition between 
the inquirer that oneself is and the theory she is examining. It is just 
after this moment of awareness that logic acts. In the process of making 
a theory intelligible, logic plays the role of making sense of the internal 
consistency of its truth claims. It mediates between the individual quest 
and the external expression and recognition of one’s claims. 
But, what place does this moment occupy in the process of unifying 
the manifold of experiences?
The three categories of Peirce’s phenomenology, as we have seen, are 
universal and omni-comprehensive. Also, as we have shown, they respond 
1 “We are told that every science has its Qualitative and its Quantitative stage; not 
its qualitative stage is when dual distinctions – whether a given subject has a given 
predicate or not – suffice; the quantitative stage comes when, no longer content with 
such rough distinctions, we are required to insert a possible half-way between every 
two possible conditions of the subject in regard to its possession of the quality indicated 
by the predicate.” (Peirce, 1888, 251).
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to a dynamic process which, in a sense, contains even our own existence: 
“Just as we say that a body is in motion and not that motion is in a body 
we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thought are in us.” 
(Peirce, 1868b, 42 footnote). Words, signs, theories are representations 
of preeminent bits of the train of thoughts. In this sense, the Theory of 
Categories developed by Peirce is also a sign, or a group of signs. And, 
consistently, the words firstness, secondness and thirdness are in the 
purest sense representations of universal events in the train of thought. 
In this sense, each of them represents a bit in a continuum that occupies, 
as we have seen, the whole process of understanding. If we take them as 
a formal expression of frozen moments, it can be said that the fluidity 
of thought orbits around them. However, in so far as it is obvious that 
other material, concrete moments can be signalled between one category 
and another, it can also be said that there could be a formal sub-category 
placed in between two of the three categories that Peirce conceived. 
Actually, a continuum can be divided infinitely. In the material sense, for 
example, some kind of poetry can be understood as in between firstness 
and secondness because it aims for a pure quality, but in being expressed 
it disappears, and at the same time, it tends toward delimitation, but it 
never quite reaches real relation. 
Can logic be understood as a moment in itself? Can it be understood 
as a quasi-conception that lies between secondness and thirdness? We are 
not yet at the stage of testing the truth of a theory by testing its content 
in a laboratory experiment but only at the stage of testing its formal 
validity. This moment of logical examination could be called second-
and-a-halfness, a moment in which doubt can arise or remain silent. If 
doubt arises, it is to be understood not as a subjective insecurity but as 
an objective problem in the theory qua fact. And, hence, in the mind of 
the author of such a theory, “if disciplined and candid minds carefully 
examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create doubts in 
the mind of the author” (Peirce, 1868b, 29). Second-and-a-halfness is 
not a new category; it is just a middle stage that shares something with 
secondness, namely, the appearance of distinctiveness, and something 
with thirdness, namely the outcropping intelligibility of the object. It 
expresses the dunamikos of the inquiry. It is the form of a scientific, 
reasonable doubt. 
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LogIc aNd commuNIty: PRagmatIcIst PRaxIs
Logic serves as an explicit law of reasoning. The key word here is 
explicit, because in the process of examining a theory it is necessary to 
overcome the mere opinion one has about it, or the feeling of agreement 
or disagreement, and instead employ logic deliberately. Hence, logic also 
serves as an objective set of rules that makes it possible to set opinion aside. 
Logic lives in the space created between the community of inquirers and 
its effective channel of communication. It is, as it were, the constitution 
of the community of inquirers, a community that aims at the real. 
And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must 
first have had when we discovered that here was an unreal, an illusion; 
that is, when we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which 
alone this fact logically called, was between an ens relative to private 
inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and 
an ens such as would stand in the long run. The real is that which, 
sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and 
which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, 
the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception 
essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite 
limits, and capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge. And so 
those two series of cognitions, -the real and the unreal, consist of 
those which, at a time sufficiently future, the community will always 
continue to reaffirm; and of those which, under the same conditions, 
will ever after be denied (Peirce, 1868b, 52).
Therefore, logic is the rule which a member of such a community must 
obey in order to be loyal to the community, in order to be a committed 
citizen, to turn personal, private, untransferable, subjective experiences 
into communal, public and transferable objective knowledge. 
Nevertheless, the stage of second-and-a-halfness, this state of doubt, 
asks for logic to be explicitly stated to be able to critique the scientific 
tradition, that is, the assumed truth. In this explicit statement, there is a 
will to challenge every sign, every proposition and every argument that 
configure a theory and, more generally, to challenge the conception of 
truth at any given time. Aware of herself and her role thanks to ignorance 
and error, an inquirer must assume that her nature is equal to other 
inquirers’ nature. 
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The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by 
ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, 
and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. (Peirce, 
1868b, 55).
Her own being as negation must become negation of another’s being 
as negation. She must be a witness for others. She must compete against 
others. The need for explicit logic thus implies a commitment to polemos. 
True members of this COMMUNITY are those who, within the rules of 
the scientific method,2 make their experiences compete, make their errors 
challenge each other’s reciprocally. Those who assume imperfection as 
the only vehicle to go along the pathway towards truth are the only true 
members of the community of inquirers. 
Therefore, logic is a question not only of validity but also of both 
clarity and the possibility of law and error. Let us examine this in detail. 
Logic becomes a question of clarity in the sense that an inference must be 
expressed. So when we say that it is not only a question of validity, we 
mean that beyond securing a given induction, deduction or hypothesis in 
a formal way, logic is also an external activity aimed at being understood 
by a community of inquirers. Clarity is here structure. It is a formal 
path to express the thought process. It is not a consensus in the sense of 
tradition, nor is it clarity in the sense of an agreement about a universe of 
words or of meanings. Logic is, in this first sense, a condition of possibility 
of awareness of being part of the same conversation. In being clarity, it 
becomes absolute openness. It opens the path for thirdness to appear, 
meaning that complete intelligibility in the universe of science presupposes 
this formal validity as the type of thinkable clarity. Therefore, it is law. 
But not law as habit, not the nomological tendency of science, nor law 
as the universal determination of nature. Rather, law as enforcement, 
as force. Law as limit. Law as the formal dike that keeps confusion and 
imposition at bay. If thirdness is the content of a principle, logic represents 
the fact that a principle comes first, and that principality emerges from 
the brute fact and moves towards the intelligibility of the content of 
the law. But, as that type of force, it is also the possibility of naming 
an error, and thus of undertaking the process of correction. Because it 
2 To challenge the method itself would open up a new set of questions and problems. 
Essentially, it would raise the question of radically different paradigms and the possibilities 
of their comparison or communication. Would polemos even be possible?
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sets limits for the examination of the content of a scientific theory or a 
given hypothesis, and because it sets the conditions for clarity and law, it 
conveys the possibility of shaping an objection and being precise about it. 
This triad clarity, enforcement and correction becomes the social and 
political base for a community of inquirers. The question then becomes: 
Can what we have described here be established as a basis for community 
in general? The problem we are facing here is the problem of rational 
political systems. Its dangers are historically known, and its problems are 
already contained in its formulation: total rationality implies abstracting 
from circumstances, and when a rational principle is applied in politics, 
often this abstraction away from circumstance becomes rejection of it. 
Kant links his concept of pure reason with moral and political principles 
thanks to his notions of universality and autonomy, which allows freedom 
to become central and circumstance to be a limit. But, eventually, abstract 
concepts of understanding can be followed by pure political impositions 
regardless of the proposal that Kant himself offered, i.e., there is this 
possibility of the tyranny of determinative judgment. Modern rationality 
often ends up in the notion of a static truth, that is, a rationalised dogma. 
And, it therefore excludes pluralism or includes it as a lesser evil. The 
reason behind this is that modern rationality seems to exclude dynamism. 
Indeed, both seem to exclude each other. Peirce’s pragmaticism, on the 
other hand, can become a political mirror of evolutionism, which is 
a dynamic form of rationale, for several reasons: he is less concerned 
with foundations and ontological origins and instead absolutely focussed 
on consequence and external forces. In this sense, he is also focused on 
acknowledging the static nature of given representations in contrast to 
the dynamism of what is represented, including thought and life. The 
relationship between object, sign and interpretant can give us a clue into 
what a Peircean sense of the concept of political may be. 
A sign is anything which stands for something to something. What 
the sign stands for is its object and what it stands to is its interpretant. 
(...) Every sign has two objects, a dynamic object, that is, the real, 
efficient object, but not “immediately present object” and an immediate 
object, the object as the sign represents it. And every sign has three 
interpretants, a final (or logical) interpretant, which is the “effect 
that would be produced on the mind by the sign after sufficient 
development of thought” a dynamic interpretant, which is the “effect 
actually produced on the mind” and an immediate interpretant, which 
is the interpretant represented or signified in the sign (CP 8.343). 
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Any given sign only partially reveals its dynamic object, and that 
partial revelation constitutes its immediate object. Similarly, the final 
interpretant of a sign is the result of a history of semiotic interaction 
with the given dynamic object, while the dynamic interpretant is the 
immediate significance of the sign independent of any previous history 
involving its object (Houser, 1992, XXXVI).
 
If we substitute in this paragraph political representative for sign; 
society or country or people for object, and state or legislation for 
interpretant, we see how the dynamic conception of the world and the 
mind that Peirce holds implies a form of unfixable usage of reason in 
the organisation of a community. Indeed, it supposes the existence of 
a community as a dynamic body, representable only as an immediate 
moment, not as a fixed form or abstraction. (So under this vision, we 
could rename the state the occasion).
This is what we will call praxis, which is a kind of adaptation of 
principle in light of consequence. At the same time, praxis needs an 
acknowledgment of the imperfection of all solutions and the awareness 
that only through that acknowledgment does correction arrive. The 
role that the individual plays in this way of addressing a community 
includes his uniqueness and incomparableness as a necessary negation of 
all the rest, as a form of signified otherness, a present wholeness facing 
the imperfection of tradition at any given time. Freedom is, then, the 
possibility of expressing oneself as a sign of one’s own dynamism at any 
given time. And community is the possibility of acknowledging one’s 
own error and thus one’s own existence and consciousness. 
Let us finish then with this second-and-a-halfness that we introduced as 
a means to express the dynamism that flows under the Peircean categories, 
logic as a middle-way between brute fact and intelligibility. We have said 
that in the community of inquirers it meant clarity, enforcement and 
correction, and this lead us to an evolutionary concept of political praxis. 
Now, if reasons are signs of past mistakes and their consequences are 
their logical interpretants, we are facing a political praxis that renders a 
given situation of a society the dynamic object of representation, of which 
any political analysis will be as dynamic as it itself is, regardless of their 
similarity, consistency or identity. 
Therefore, the introduction of logic in this Peircean sense opens the 
door for a rational-pragmaticist political system that explains divergence, 
opposition and political confrontation as signs of the existence of a real 
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community. In other words, divergence and political confrontation are 
virtues of a pramaticist political system rather than the lesser evil of a 
modern rationalistic system.
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